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Keeping the state accountable: is aid no better 
than oil?1 
By 
Ole Therkildsen 
 
Aid may influence accountability relations in recipient countries in various direct and 
indirect ways.  One set of mechanisms are the ways in which aid and aid donors affect 
taxation and related processes within recipient countries – the amount of tax raised, 
the choice among different types of taxes, collection methods, budgeting, and public 
spending patterns.  The purpose of this article is to evaluate what we know about 
these issues, with special reference to aid-dependent Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
The aid-taxation nexus is relatively neglected in the debate about how donors may 
influence accountability relations within aid dependent countries.  Much attention is, 
for example, devoted to the effects of the involvement of donors in activities that 
directly aim to strengthen public administrative accountability through improvements 
in organisational arrangements, budgeting, accounting, and reporting procedures.  The 
debate also focuses on political accountability.  Donors try, for instance, to promote 
democratisation through support for or conditionalities about multiparty elections, 
strengthening of non-governmental organisations, and funding of cit izens’ awareness 
campaigns.  Donors have placed more emphasis on these issues during the 1990s, and 
there is a lively debate about their impact (Goldsmith, 2001).  Some of the indirect 
channels through which donors affect accountability processes in recipient countries 
are also much debated: for example, the influence of aid on fragmentation of public 
institutions and budgeting processes; on corruption; and on prioritising accountability 
to donors rather than to domestic political actors (Therkildsen, 2001a).   
 
That aid, and donors, may affect taxation - and through this may influence 
accountability relations - has only recently started to receive attention.  Moore (1998, 
                                                 
1 This paper was written in connection with the research programme ‘Taxation, Aid 
and Democracy’ funded by the Research Council of Norway and by Danida. 
 2 
2001) has developed an idea that is examined in this article: that aid, much like oil 
income, influences state-society relations in specific, harmful ways.  Inspired by 
rentier state theories,2 the basic argument is that when states gain substantial incomes 
from external sources, such as oil, minerals or foreign assistance, they do not need to 
levy domestic taxes and therefore become less accountable to the societies they 
govern aid=oil).  The other proposition examined here is that donors, through their 
influence on tax policies and administration - in particular in setting revenue targets - 
have considerable influence on tax collection methods and budgeting in ways that 
may weaken accountability.  The aid=oil argument is assessed using the results of 
Ross’ (2001) great efforts empirically to test the impact of oil incomes on 
accountability relations using rentier state theories.  The link from donors to tax 
collection methods and budgeting is illustrated by findings from an ongoing research 
programme on taxation, aid and democracy  (Fjeldstad et. al., 2000). 
 
I conclude that incomes from oil and aid share some common features that justify the 
use of rentier state theories to assess possible aid-accountability linkages.  On the 
other hand, there are also differences: aid, and donors, may influence accountability 
relations in ways that are not captured by such theories. Conclusions are drawn in the 
final section.  
 
Aid donors, state incomes and state expenditures 
Incomes from oil and aid share some common features.  They are paid by foreign 
actors; they are often substantial and accrue directly to the state; and only few people 
in the recipient government are involved in generating them, while many are involved 
in using and distributing them (Beblawi, 1997, 51).  Moore’s (1998) conceptualisation 
of aid as ‘unearned income’ fits.  These common features justify the use of rentier 
state theories to explore how aid may influence governance relations.  However, there 
are also differences between oil and aid income.  The use of oil income is typically 
controlled by oil exporting governments themselves.  In contrast, aid funds are never 
completely controlled by the recipient governments, not even general budget support 
or other less conditional types of aid.  Donors influence taxation practices of recipient 
                                                 
2 Reviewed, for example, by Cooley (1999) and Ross (1999, 2001).     
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governments in a number of ways that have no parallel in oil economies.  Donor 
influence ranges from providing technical advice and funds with few strings attached 
to conditional demands for specific policies on tax or other issues, sometimes tied to 
signals about withdrawal of funding in cases of non-compliance. 
 
Aid is provided through various modalities depending on its motivation  (military, 
political, commercial, cultural or developmental) and on changing ideas about aid 
policy.  In the 1990s, there has been an increasing focus on institutions, governance, 
civil society organisations and poverty in addition to the continuing focus on macro-
economic policies.  The composition of aid flows has changed correspondingly, with 
a growing emphasis on untied balance-of-payment support and debt relief - and less 
on project aid (World Bank, 2000, chapter 8).  Next, donors influence recipient tax 
policies.  For years, the IMF and the World Bank in particular have pushed for 
revenue enhancement (higher ratios of government revenue to GDP); broadening the 
tax base (typically through the introduction of Value Added Tax, reduction of 
exemptions, etc); and reducing and simplifying tax rates to increase compliance and 
diminish economic distortions.  These prescriptions tend to be “one size fits all” 
despite wide differences in existing tax systems across countries.  In addition, donors 
have become increasingly involved in tax administration and tax collection methods.  
Most prominently, they have actively supported the establishment of Revenue 
Authorities as executive agencies.  These have especially spread in English speaking 
countries during the 1990s (Gloppner and Rakner in this Bulletin).  More generally, 
donors have provided assistance to strengthen tax administration and accountability, 
to improve taxpayer compliance and to diminish corruption.  The focus has been on 
efficiency.  Little or no efforts have been made to strengthen taxpayers’ voice 
(Barbone et al., 1999, table 2).  Finally, donors have taken an active interest in how 
state incomes are spent - not only aid funds, but also domestically generated revenues.  
The focus on the expenditure side is evident in the structural adjustment programmes 
that started in the 1980s.  It is also reflected in donors’ recent concern with poverty 
reduction strategies.  Local government taxation is the only major area of revenue 
generation - measured in terms of the number of people in contact with tax authorities, 
not in the amount of funds actually collected - in which donors so far have been 
relatively inactive.  
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Over the last couple of decades, there have been major changes in this taxation-aid-
donor nexus.  The per capita size of donor funds to Sub-Saharan Africa peaked in 
1990 and since declined by 60 percent.  On the other hand, donor involvement in tax 
policies and administration - as well as in expenditure policies - seems to have 
increased steadily in many countries.  There are, however, wide differences in donor 
involvement across countries.  The taxation-aid-donor nexus is a moving object of 
study, whose influence on accountability is complex and multi-directional.   
 
 
Testable propositions based on rentier state theories  
To the extent that aid is relatively untied, it may affect state-society relations in ways 
similar to oil incomes.  According to rentier state theories, which were developed by 
scholars of the Middle East to explain the prominence of authoritarian regimes in this 
region, oil incomes strongly influence political bargaining processes - or the lack of 
them - between state and society.   
 
Ross (2001) has made the most ambitious attempts so far to test of the hypothesis that 
oil hinders democracy.3  Scepticism about this kind of analysis is justified because it 
depends on the quantification of complex political and social processes that vary 
widely across countries.  Its strength are the variety of cases covered and the testing of 
specific causal mechanisms linking state incomes from oil and political outcomes.  If 
the results are treated as suggestive rather than conclusive, as Ross himself 
                                                 
3 He uses regression analyses on pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 
states between 1971 and 1997. These include a variety of oil and non-oil exporters, 
rich and poor countries, and countries from OECD, Latin America, Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East. ‘Regime’ is the dependent variable - a composite of indicators of 
autocracy and democracy. It includes measures of the way chief executives are 
recruited; whether they are constrained by, and accountable to, other actors; the 
existence of competitive elections, and so on (p.358). Among the independent 
controlling variables are income, religion (Islam), region and regime type in the prior 
five-year period.  
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recommends, his work also contributes to a better empirically based understanding of 
the accountability effects of aid and donors.  
 
The effect of unearned income 
Ross’s central finding is that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule 
and this effect is not limited to the Middle East.  Moreover, oil wealth matters not 
only when it comprises very high proportions of GDP: ”barrel for barrel, oil harms 
democracy more in oil-poor than in oil- rich ones” (Ross, 2001, 343).  The effects 
occur over relatively short periods.4  This suggests that even modest levels of aid to 
poor countries may affect accountability relations; that the effects may occur in the 
short run; and that the timing of aid in relation to the recipient country’s social and 
political context is very important for the influences that aid is likely to have on state-
society relations.   
 
What are the causal mechanisms that may explain such antidemocratic properties of 
oil?  Ross identifies several testable causal mechanisms derived from rentier state and 
other theories.  
 
”Taxation effects”  
According to Ross, they occur because states receiving ”sufficient incomes” from the 
sale of oil are likely to tax their populations less.  In turn, the public will be less likely 
to demand accountability from - and representation in - their government (p. 332).  
This is a core proposition of rentier state theories.  Things get complicated here.  Are 
states satisfiers or maximisers of incomes?  Ross argues the former; other researchers 
disagree.  Devarajan et. al. (1999), for example, find that aid has little impact on 
aggregate levels of taxation.  Moore (1998) notes the same.  
 
However, Ross claims support for the taxation effect on the basis of the finding that 
the proportion of state revenues derived from personal and income taxes is strongly 
and positively associated with more accountable government.  This is really a test of 
the influence of the composition of state revenues on regime type - rather than their 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, large oil discoveries in rich European states like Britain, 
Denmark and Norway do not appear to have significant anti-democratic effects.   
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size.  Furthermore, the direction of causality may run the opposite way: regime type 
may influence the composition of revenue.  Ross dismisses this, possibility arguing 
that ”more democratic governments should be less disposed to fund themselves 
through personal and corporate taxes, given their unpopularity” (p.348-9).  This seems 
to contradict his own finding and is factually problematic.  On the one hand, personal 
income tax and the emergence of democratic representation seem closely linked in 
Western countries leading to growing reliance on direct taxation (with variations 
across countries) over the last hundred years (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, table 
III.2).  On the other hand, in Latin American, where democratisation and political 
freedoms have progressed, personal income taxation is low and falling.  States here 
seem to have a weak leverage over their economic elites (DiJohn and Putzel, 2000, 
29).  
 
This implies that the ”taxation effect” of aid funds may be less straightforward than 
claimed by rentier state theories.  Even if aid may make states more independent of 
their societies in revenue terms, state actors are not shielded from the social bases of 
support that help to keep them in power.  Conceivably, aid could, in some contexts,  
help to strengthen social groups demanding more taxation for various purposes as 
well as the state's capacity to enforce such taxation.  In other contexts, aid may have 
the opposite effects.  Therefore the extent to which aid may influence tax efforts 
(political and administrative), choices of tax instruments (hence revenue 
composition), and tax incidence (and hence who will carry the tax burden) is an 
empirical question best assessed in a specific context.  
 
Expenditure effects 
Rentier state theories focus not only on how state incomes are obtained, but also on 
how they are spent.  Ross identifies three causal mechanisms.  ”Spending effects” 
arise because incomes from oil may lead to greater spending on patronage, which in 
turn reduces demands for democratisation.  A ”group formation effect” occurs when 
the state uses its incomes to prevent formation of independent social groups that may 
demand political rights.  Finally, a ”repression effect” occurs when incomes from oil 
allow recipient states to spend more on internal security, and so block democratic 
aspirations.  
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Ross finds statistical support for all three effects, but the limitations of his approach 
are obvious.  Thus, he measures the ”spending effect” by government consumption as 
percentage of GDP.  This consumption includes all current spending for purchases of 
goods and services including wages and salaries.  The ”group formation” effect is 
captured by the share of GDP accounted for by government activities, while the 
”repression effect ” is measured by military spending.  These are very crude and 
simplified indicators.  Their magnitudes tell little about the extent to which political 
support is purchased through patronage, independent groups are suppressed through 
expanding government activities, or military spending is actually used for internal 
oppression.  
 
Nevertheless, Ross is right in pointing out that the way states spend incomes may 
have implications for the political bargaining processes.  The assumption in rentier 
state theories is that abundant state funds are used strategically for political purposes 
and that such spending discourages opposition groups from mobilising.  This is an 
interesting proposition, but it is questionable whether spending only has the intended 
de-mobilising effects.    
 
With respect to aid, there are clear cases of it being given by donors and used by 
recipient governments to avert political demands for representation and 
accountability, especially during the Cold War period.  Such cases may re-emerge in 
the new war on terrorism.  Yet, at present, donors typically try to limit military 
spending, and to encourage the funding of social services and non-governmental 
organisations.  This, as well as domestic pressures, have helped to change recipient 
government expenditures in some countries (Therkildsen, 2001a).  How this may 
affect political mobilisation is unclear.  The increased funding of social services may 
promote tax compliance, although the causal linkages are complex (Therkildsen, 
2001b).  It may also increase demands for extending such service to other groups.  We 
lack understanding of how specific spending patterns affect the political bargaining 
processes with respect to representation and demands for accountability.  
 
Societal factors  
Modernisation theory holds that democratisation is influenced by changes in 
occupational specialisation, urbanisation and levels of education, which in turn are 
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caused by economic development.  Ross uses such societal factors to explain 
variations in accountability relations across countries and claims some support for 
their significance - although the evidence is not very convincing, as he admits (p. 354, 
footnote 70).  His choice of modernisation theories is probably motivated by the need 
to find quantifiable variables for the regression analyses.  To find such variables it is, 
however, more relevant to focus on how taxation may affect societal groups and 
political bargaining.    
 
One line of thinking emphasises the importance of owners or controllers of mobile 
capital.  It is influenced by European experiences (summarised by Moore, 1998, 
2001).  Here, representative government emerged from political struggles between 
rulers and private owners of capital about taxation in exchange for representation and 
influence on spending.  Negotiation was to the advantage of both parties as taxes 
became more predictable and revenues more stable.  Corporate representation of 
owners of capital was necessary for such bargaining to be effective.  But this process 
did not take root everywhere.  In addition, cultural context and economic structure 
played an important role.  The process was most pronounced where capital was 
mobile (i.e. in the form of financial and trading assets).  Here the mutual advantages 
of co-operation were greatest.  
 
Another line of thinking focuses on the political importance of certain types of 
immobile capital.  It is influenced by research in poor and developmental states.  The 
argument is that the autonomy of a state – and hence its capacity to tax – varies across 
economic sectors and is particularly influenced by the leading export sectors (Shaffer, 
1995).  State autonomy is especially low in relation to sectors characterised by both 
(a) high barriers to entry and exit and a limited ability to cope with international 
market fluctuations and (b) domination by a few large firms able to overcome 
collective action problems.  Mining and plantation-based export activities dominated 
by multinational corporations are examples of such inflexible sectors, as Shaffer calls 
them.  These sectors, including their organised labour interests, are difficult to govern 
due both to their capacity to press demands fo r assistance on the state, and to their 
vulnerability to international market swings.  
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Over the years, aid has been used to both strengthen and weaken mobile and immobile 
capital as donors often actively support economic interest groups and their capacity to 
access and influence government policies on taxation and tax administration (Rakner, 
2001).  This support may have both short and long term influences on tax based 
accountability relations.  To these various economic relations should be added social 
relations of power which may have reinforcing, neutralising or countervailing effects 
on economy-influenced state-society relations (Eriksen, 2001).  Knowledge about 
how aid influences societal political demands is still limited.   
 
 
Other propositions 
From a taxation point of view, the main difference between oil and aid income is that 
donors are increasingly directly involved in recipient country tax policy making and 
tax administration - even if some aid (like oil) is given with few strings attached and 
requires little effort by recipient governments vis-à-vis its taxpayers.  This donor 
involvement may have significant but unintended influences on state accountability.  
Donor involvement in revenue target setting is a particularly illustrative case of this.  
As the following analyses shows, it can have important implications for tax collection 
methods and hence for taxpayer rights as well as for administrative accountability.  
Obviously, such effects are not considered in the rentier state theories and the 
empirical tests of the theories that were summarised above. 
 
Revenue targets and taxpayer rights 
Fjeldstad (2001) has shown how coercion in local government tax collection may be 
an unintended result of donor demands for matching funds from local authorities 
receiving aid.  We have less evidence on the ways in which accountability is affected 
by donor demands for higher central government revenue.  This may result in 
distortions of formal procedures for tax collection and misuse of power as effective 
protection of taxpayer rights is weak (Luoga, this volume).  
 
In Tanzania and Uganda, as elsewhere, a reduction of the budget deficit is an 
important concern and it is a central component of the Washington consensus 
prescriptions.  Increasing revenues is one way to address a budget deficit.  Targets for 
 10 
the ratio of revenue to GDP are therefore often written into agreements with the IMF.  
Such targets are taken seriously because an IMF-supported programme is, in practice, 
a condition for receiving programme aid from other donors as well (Bulir and 
Hamann, 2001, 6).  
 
For Tanzania, a target of a one-percentage point of GDP increase from 1999 was 
regarded as “conservative” by the World Bank (1999, 6), despite very modest 
improvements in aggregate revenue collection before that.  This target has not been 
achieved.  For Uganda, the annual targets were two percentage point increases in 
revenue of GDP in the early 1990s, one in the mid-1990s, and 0.5% at the end of the 
decade.  This latter figure remains the long-term goal.  Despite these reductions over 
time, these targets have not been met either.  There is no indication that they were 
discussed or sanctioned by Parliament before agreement with the multilateral donors.  
 
Interviews with staff in the organisations involved, and with close observers outside 
them, give the clear impression that revenue target setting is more of an art than a 
science.  Moreover, technical feasibility is just one criterion for setting targets.  Other 
motivations are to put pressure on the tax administration to do better, and to justify 
donor support for tax administration.  Such ambitious targets influence tax collection 
efforts and methods.  To meet targets, tax collectors tend to focus on relatively large 
and profitable taxpayers operating in the formal economy.  The pressure amplifies the 
“arbitrariness” that characterises tax administration in Tanzania and Uganda 
(Reinikka and Svenson, 1999, 28; see also Anena and Gariyo, 2000; Luoga, 2001 and 
this volume).  Among the signs are the frequent and drawn out audits; the limited time 
given to taxpayers to respond to inquiries; the arbitrary disallowance of expenses; 
bribing; delays in tax refunding; early resort to distraint and attachment measures; and 
poor or non-existent adjudication of tax disputes.  
 
Over-ambitious, donor- influenced, revenue targets do not cause such tax 
administration problems, but make them worse and point to fundamental issues of 
citizenship as Luoga points out.  For increased emphasis on revenue targets highlights 
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the lack of adequate protection of taxpayer rights; uncertainty and ambiguities of tax 
laws and regulations; and the serious problems with appeal mechanisms.5  
 
 
Revenue targets, cash budgets and accountability  
Moore (1998, 106-109) has pointed out how donor funding may cause fragmentation 
of already weakly institutionalised budgeting and auditing.  This further undermines 
budget-based accountability mechanisms.  The sectoral investment programmes, in 
which donors pool their funds to support sector-wide activities, is therefore a step in 
the right direction.  On the other hand, the cash budgeting arrangements introduced in 
many African countries in the 1990s may create new accountability problems related 
to budgeting and revenues.  
 
Cash budgeting is an institutional innovation that aims to reduce excessive fiscal 
deficits.  Specific arrangements vary across countries but two features are common.  
One is that the main expenditure-control mechanism is the monitoring of cash 
disbursements rather than line ministries’ expenditure commitments.  The other is that 
actual cash disbursements depend on the revenues and aid incomes actually obtained. 
No public money is to be disbursed without funds in hand.  Uganda was the first 
African country to adopt this arrangement in 1992.  Tanzania followed some years 
later, as did several other countries.  Experiences have shown that fiscal discipline did 
improve because the cash budget arrangement strengthens the control of ministries of 
finance over line ministries’ expenditures (Stasavage and Moyo, 2000).  On the other 
                                                 
5 Taxpayer rights problems are not confined to central government taxation. A sample 
survey of central and local government prisons in Uganda shows that the likelihood of 
prison detention is much higher for non-payment of the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT 
is collected by and accruing to local authorities) than for non-payment or evasion of 
central government taxes. The arbitrariness of taxation is exacerbated by the fact that 
the GPT is small, and only paid by a fraction of the liable population, while taxes due 
to central government are generally much higher, and believed to be frequently 
evaded. In fact, hardly any person is detained in a prison due to offences involving 
central government taxes.  
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hand, cash budgeting exacerbates the accountability problems of already weakly 
institutionalised budgeting.  
 
A standard justification for the introduction of a cash budget to curb excess fiscal 
deficits is that the expenditure commitment controls hitherto used have proved to be 
inadequate.  This is true, but deficits are also caused by unrealistic revenue targets and 
unpredictable aid.6  Cash budget arrangements create a succession of budget crises as 
fund releases depend on funds actually in hand.  Ambitious revenue targets combined 
with aid disbursements that are more volatile than revenues - especially in highly aid-
dependent countries (Bulir and Hamann, 2001, 30) - often exacerbate this expenditure 
volatility problem. 7 Budgeting and planning horizons shrink to the period stipulated 
by the cash budget disbursements - monthly or quarterly depending on country.  
Under such conditions it makes little sense to even try to hold officials accountable 
for activities delayed or output targets not met.  Planning and budgeting is still done, 
but have mainly symbolic meaning, as many officials openly admit (Government of 
Tanzania, 1998).   
 
Conclusions  
Similarities between incomes from oil and aid - in particular the fact that they do not 
derive from political and administrative efforts to tax domestic activities - justify the 
use of empirical tests of rentier state theories to explore if aid incomes have similar 
influences on state-society relations as oil.  Ross’ quantitative tests of the influence of 
oil incomes on political representation and accountability, using a large sample of 
countries, show that rentier state theories do have some general explanatory power in 
                                                 
6 The actual effect depends on how close the budgeted expenditures are set to 
projected revenue and aid incomes.  
7 The disadvantages of cash budgeting is generally considered to be increased 
volatility of expenditures; a skewed composition of expenditures due to differential 
ministerial influence on the actual allocations of funds; and the general 
marginalisation of line ministries within the budget process. All three problems 
existed prior to cash budgeting, but tend - depending on the country in question - to be 
amplified by it (Stasavage and Moyo, 2000). 
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substantiating the oil-hinders-democracy proposition.  On the other hand, his tests and 
specifications of causal mechanisms to support this proposition are less convincing.  
His identification of and arguments for such mechanisms is, however, suggestive of 
how the accountability effects of aid incomes could be better specified, contextualised 
and tested.   
 
More context-specific case studies are therefore needed to sort out the complex and 
multi-directional causal relations between taxation, aid and accountability.  Such 
studies must not just consider the income enhancing effects of aid, but also the 
influences of donors and aid on fiscal, taxation and expenditures policies and on the 
political mobilisation and demobilisation of societal groups.  It is also necessary to 
consider how social relations of power may reinforce or neutralise taxation-aid-donor 
influences on state-society relations: fiscal relations are not the only influences on 
political bargaining processes. 
 
Furthermore, differences between oil and aid income - in particular that aid donors are 
extensively involved in tax policies and administration - make it necessary to go 
beyond rentier state theories to understand the linkages between taxation, aid and 
accountability.  The analyses of the effects of donor involvement in central 
government revenue targets on tax collection methods, taxpayer rights and budget-
based administrative accountability clearly show this.   
 
Finally, we need an appropriate concept of accountability if we are to do further 
empirical research into the relationships between taxation, aid and accountability.  
Such a concepts needs to take into account the importance of tax administration and 
taxpayer rights.  A good starting point is therefore Tilly’s (1997, 198) conception of 
democracy as a particular type of citizenship which combines ”broad and relatively 
equal citizenship with (a) binding consultation of citizens in regard to state personnel 
and policies as well as (b) protection of citizens from arbitrary state action."  This 
”democracy” concept does not stipulate ideal outcomes or specific institutional 
arrangements.  Moreover, a country’s particular political system is characterised by 
various combinations of equality of citizenship - which only refers to claims on and 
from the state in a person’s capacity as a citizen; breadth of citizenship 
(inclusiveness); extent of binding consultations; and protection of citizens.  The 
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concept is therefore analytically useful across a range of different types of state-
citizen relationships, and it captures important accountability aspects of taxation in 
poor countries - arbitrariness and coercion - that are often overlooked.  
 
There is still some way to go before we can answer with confidence the question 
posed in the title of this article.  The question is important.  
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